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Electricity Pricing in New Zealand and the Australian State of Queensland: Accounting 
for the Impact of Sector Restructuring 
Abstract 
The electricity industries of New Zealand (NZ) and the Australian state of Queensland have 
undergone substantial structural and regulatory reform with the common intent to improve 
economic efficiency. Deregulation and privatisation have been key elements of the reform 
but have been approached differently by each jurisdiction. This study traces the link between 
structural and regulatory regimes and asset valuation, profits and, ultimately, pricing. The 
study finds that key drivers in recent price increases are the government-owned generation 
and retail sector in NZ and the government-owned distribution sector in Queensland. It is 
concluded that, contrary to the rationale for the imposition of regulatory controls in a non-
market environment, the regulatory regimes appear to have contributed to higher rather than 
lower pricing structures. 
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Electricity Pricing in New Zealand and the Australian State of Queensland: Accounting 
for the Impact of Sector Restructuring 
INTRODUCTION 
Internationally, many countries have undertaken reforms in their electricity industries. 
Although the scope and intensity of the reforms differed across countries, the reforms have 
brought about the dismantling of an industry that was characterised by its monopolistic 
vertically integrated generation, distribution and supply structure. The traditional structure 
was justified by the economic, social and political importance of electricity (Yi-chong, 2005); 
however, by the 1980s there was a concern that the industry was failing to deliver (see Helm, 
2004). For developed countries, concern over capacity and demand imbalances, and 
productive inefficiency drove the reform agenda to bring about improved efficiency; whereas 
for developing countries, the immediate concern was a shortage of capacity and hence a 
reform agenda that focused on the need for access and reliability of supply (Pollitt, 2009; 
Williams & Ghanadan, 2006). 
 
The electricity industries of New Zealand (NZ) and Queensland 1  (Australia) were not 
immune to the international trend for reform, and during the 1980s and 1990s the respective 
industries underwent fundamental change in their operational and ownership structures (see 
Gunn, 1997; Sharma, 2003). Consistent with what was happening in other developed 
jurisdictions, the industry reforms were undertaken with the expectation of improved 
economic efficiency2. Improving efficiency is dependent on a comprehensive approach to 
reform, including an appropriate interface between sectors of the industry, competition, and a 
regulatory regime that prevents monopoly pricing where competition is not present. Although 
there is a body of literature that has examined electricity regulation and ownership, prior 
research has primarily focused on individual sectors of the industry (e.g. Shuttleworth, 2005; 
Jamasb & Pollitt, 2007; Joskow, 2008; Mountain & Littlechild, 2010). The study reported in 
this paper takes a broader approach and examines the inter-relationship between electricity 
industry sectors - generation, transmission, distribution and retailing 3  - with a view to 
comparing the regulatory controls and ownership structures of the NZ and Queensland 
electricity industries and the costs and price movements in the respective markets. The NZ 
and Queensland electricity industries have a similar number of electricity connections, but 
differences in ownership structures and operational scope provide a unique research 
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environment. The contextual differences are identified and explored to investigate why the 
cost of electricity distribution has risen relatively slowly in NZ, compared to Queensland, 
following industry restructuring; and conversely, why electricity generation and retailing 
costs have risen much faster in NZ than in Queensland.   
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section explains the operational and ownership 
structures of the NZ and Queensland electricity industries and is followed by a section which 
scopes literature relevant to the restructured electricity industries in Australia and NZ within 
the context of economic reforms. Then an introduction to regulation theory and the relevant 
regulatory controls applied to the sectors being studied is provided.  This is followed by a 
section which compares and contrasts the electricity industries of the two jurisdictions over 
the period of industry reform (2000-2011) focusing on the relationship between economic 
outcomes and ownership; and the effect of different accounting treatments, particularly in 
regard to asset valuations.  The paper ends with a conclusion.  
 
OPERATIONAL AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 
New Zealand 
Prior to restructuring, the generation and transmission of electricity in NZ was dominated by 
one state-owned entity, while more than 60 Electric Power Boards (EPBs) and Municipal 
Electricity Departments (MEDs) were responsible for electricity distribution and retailing 
within set geographical areas. The Boards of EPBs and MEDs were elected by the 
community and accountability was to their local electorate, based largely on providing an 
acceptable level of service at a minimum price to residential consumers.  This resulted in 
cross-subsidisation by other consumer groups (industrial and commercial). This situation has 
changed. EPBs and MEDs were corporatised in 1992 as ‘electricity distribution companies’ 
and regulations introduced in 1998 prevent them from generating or retailing electricity. The 
new companies were required to sell their retail businesses. Thus, by 1998 the businesses of 
distribution and retailing were unbundled.  
 
Post reform, a number of electricity distribution companies amalgamated, so that there are 
currently 28 electricity distribution networks. The majority of these are fully or majority 
owned and operated by consumer trusts (21)4 or local councils (5) and distribution largely 
remains a geographically-defined monopoly. At the retail level, competition has emerged as 
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customers are able to ‘shop around’ for the best electricity unit price with the bulk of 
electricity retailing provided by state-owned entities (SOEs) who are also the major 
generators of electricity. Thus, structurally, generation and retailing are integrated (bundled) 
but distribution stands alone. Generated electricity is transmitted throughout NZ by a separate 
stand-alone entity (TransPower NZ) that is 100% government-owned.  
 
Queensland 
The Australian electricity industry has traditionally been the responsibility of individual state 
and territory governments. Pre-reform, the Queensland electricity industry was dominated by 
a vertically integrated, state government-owned structure, with centralised planning and 
operations (Sharma & Bartels, 1997). Electricity distribution and retailing were undertaken 
by the South East Queensland Electricity Board (SEQEB) within south east Queensland5 and 
six regional-based electricity distributors and their subsidiary retailers serviced the remainder 
of the State.  
 
Following the formation of a National Electricity Market in 19916, SEQEB was corporatised 
in 1997 and renamed Energex. In 2007 the retail business of Energex was sold, leaving 
Energex as the Government-owned distributor of electricity in South East Queensland. There 
are now approximately 19 listed electricity retailers operating in a contestable market7. The 
six regional electricity distributors were amalgamated and corporatised in 1999 and renamed 
Ergon Energy. However, unlike Energex, there was no requirement for Ergon Energy to 
unbundle its sector activities and it remains active as a distributor, retailer and generator8 of 
electricity. As a ‘non-competing’9 retailer, Ergon compromises the contestable Queensland 
electricity market due to the requirement to offer customers government-set electricity tariffs 
(the ‘notified electricity price’); and the inability of small customers (up to 100 MWh per 
annum) to return to Ergon should they choose another retailer10.  
 
State government-owned corporations generate approximately 70% of Queensland's 
electricity supply and all generated electricity is transmitted throughout Queensland by a 
separate state government-owned entity (Powerlink Queensland).  
 
Tables 1a and 1b summarise the ownership structures within the NZ and Queensland 
electricity industries pre- and post-reform, respectively. Post reform, and the primary focus of 
this study, competition occurs in both jurisdictions in the generation and retail sectors only.  
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In NZ, ‘Gentailers’ dominate the retail sector, and their retail market share correlates closely 
to their share of generation capacity. In Queensland, the two dominant publicly-listed 
retailers are independent of the owners of generation plant, although they may have 
contractual arrangements with generators for the supply of electricity. Notably, the NZ 
government has a controlling interest in the retail sector, but does not have any interest in the 
distribution sector whereas the Queensland government has a minority interest in the retail 
sector and full control of the distribution sector. The study finds that key price drivers are the 
government-controlled retail sector in NZ and the government-controlled distribution sector 
in Queensland.   
 
Table 1a: Ownership/Control structures prior to electricity industry reforms  
Sector New Zealand Queensland 
 Dominant Other Dominant Other 
Generation Government – 80%  Local Govt – 20% Government – 95% 5% - private 
sector 
Transmission Government – 100%  Government – 100%  
Distribution and 
retail (single 
sector) 
Local Government – 
100%  
 
 Government – 100% 
 
 
Government controlled sectors are heavily shaded. 
Community controlled sectors in NZ are partially shaded.  
Where there is participation by the private sector this has a white background.
 
Table 1b: Ownership/Control structures within the electricity industry (2012)11 
Sector New Zealand Queensland 
 Dominant Other Dominant Other 
Generation Government – 65% 
 
35% - private sector Government – 70% 
 
30% - private 
sector 
Transmission Government – 100%  Government – 100%  
Distribution Community trusts and 
municipalities -70%  
30% - private sector Government – 100% 
 
  
Retail Government – 61% 
 
39% - private sector  68% - private sector 32% - 
Government 
Government controlled sectors are heavily shaded. 
Community controlled sectors in NZ are partially shaded.  
Where there is participation by the private sector this has a white background.
 
PRIOR STUDIES ON ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY REFORMS AND 
DEREGULATION 
The restructuring of the NZ and Queensland electricity industries is part of a worldwide trend 
where governments have passed control of other industries such as airlines, railways, 
telecommunications, water supply, and ports to the corporate sector. Seen within its macro-
economic context, such divestment of control is bounded by a political move towards 
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‘smaller’ government, privatisation and an extended role of the ‘market’ (Pollitt, 2009). For 
the electricity industry, the international reform pattern extended beyond the more singular-
focused deregulation experienced by other industries to include changes within the industry 
sectors themselves. In essence, the electricity industry was ‘functionally unbundled’ thus 
enabling the competitive sectors to be exposed to competition, the reorientation of monopoly 
segments to foster competition, and to provide opportunity for alternative ownership 
structures (Sharma, 2003).   
 
The reform of electricity industries has provided a fertile ground for academic research. 
Much of the research to date has had a legal and/or economics perspective and often relates to 
specific sectors of the industry; that is, generation, transmission, distribution networks, or the 
retailing of electricity12. In this respect, Gilbert and Kahn (2007) provide a comprehensive 
comparison of the economic forces that affect electricity regulation. Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2007) studied the regulation of electricity distribution networks in Great Britain (GB) and 
the incentives for greater efficiency. Their study implies that electricity regulators should take 
into account the persuasiveness and long-term effects of incentive schemes on influencing the 
behaviour of regulated firms. Similarly, Joskow (2008) examined the theory of incentive 
regulation as applied to electricity networks, and Shuttleworth (2005) identified problems 
with applying benchmarking as a means of regulating electricity networks, positing that 
benchmarking models should be supplemented with a detailed investigation of costs to avoid 
premature claims of inefficiency. Newberry (1999) examined privatisation, restructuring and 
regulation of network utilities and contrasted the regulatory approaches of GB and the United 
States (US). Pollitt (2010) examined the deregulation of telecoms in GB and the lessons this 
might provide for electricity network regulation and, in particular, whether ‘RPI-X’ based 
price regulation is still fit for purpose.  Pollitt posited that where major innovation in terms of 
technology and organisation of the sector is desirable, price regulation of incumbent 
monopolies is likely to be a barrier to new entry. Outhred (2003) takes a broader approach in 
his study of the restructuring of the Australian electricity industry. Outhred examined all 
sectors of the industry and identified concerns to be addressed in order to provide an 
appropriate balance between centralised and decentralised decision making. Evans and 
Meade (2005) provide a comprehensive description of electricity reform in NZ. 
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Other studies have focused on pricing or financial performance.  Pollitt (1997), for example, 
examined the impact of liberalisation on the financial performance of the electricity supply 
industry internationally. In their study, Bertram and Twaddle (2005) found that price-cost 
margins increased substantially following deregulation of the NZ electricity industry (1994-
2003).  
 
Some studies have compared the performance of electricity firms operating under different 
ownership structures. There is no consensus on whether privately-owned firms exhibit 
superior performance.  For example, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) surveyed the literature that 
compared the performance of investor-owned and publicly-owned electricity utilities and 
concluded that there is little difference between public and private ownership in terms of 
technical or cost efficiency. Hooks and van Staden (2007) examined the influence of 
ownership type on the financial performance of NZ electricity entities by examining changes 
that took place from the pre- to post-corporatisation periods. They found that ownership 
structure influenced financial performance and level of debt funding. More recently, 
Mountain and Littlechild (2010) compared electricity distribution network revenues per 
customer in New South Wales (NSW) Australia, with those in GB and found that distribution 
network costs and permitted revenues were higher in NSW than in GB and were increasing at 
a significantly faster rate. They could not identify any particular reason for this but they 
highlighted private ownership in GB compared to state ownership in NSW as possible 
reasons. These factors may have influenced the nature and effectiveness of regulation. 
 
The current paper extends this body of literature by examining influences on electricity 
pricing, such as ownership and asset valuations, by comparing two jurisdictions, NZ and 
Queensland, which have similar population size and number of electricity connections. Our 
primary focus is on the distribution and retailing of electricity, but as these sector activities 
are dependent on the generation and transmission of electricity to grid exit points13 we also 
refer to these sectors. As distribution is government-owned in Queensland but not in NZ, and 
retailing is mainly government-owned in NZ but not in Queensland, we are able to examine 
governmental influences on electricity prices in the industry.   
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REGULATION 
Regulation theories are based mainly on public and private interest arguments. Public interest 
theories see regulation as a means of improving societal welfare and correcting market 
imperfections such as monopoly situations (Tower, 1993). Public interest theories assume 
that regulation is established in response to public interest objectives (Mitnick, 1980).  
Private interest theories include consumer protection theory wherein rules are designed to 
correct abuses that adversely affect certain groups (Mitnick, 1980) or for the protection and 
benefit of the public at large (Stigler, 1971).  Consumers are protected by price restrictions or 
quality controls “by encouraging the entry of firms that are more efficient…and by reducing 
industry profits to the market rate of return” (Jordan, 1972, p.152). 
 
Regulation can be heavy-handed or light-handed. Heavy-handed regulation involves stringent 
controls on prices and/or rates of return together with special purpose regulatory bodies. The 
aim is to create a position for customers similar to that of a competitive industry where 
customers exercise market power over industry competitors in order to obtain the desired 
combination of price and quality (Ogden, 1997).  The intention is for companies to focus on 
becoming more efficient and for the benefits of improved efficiency to be passed to 
customers through lower prices and better service (Miller & Rose, 1988).  In the US, for 
example, regulators use a cost of service approach to determine a fair price for electricity 
supply. Aggregate costs (including a reasonable return on investment) for providing each 
class of service (residential, commercial, and industrial) are determined. Prices are set to 
recover those costs, based on the sales volumes for each class. In principle, this allows the 
company to set tariffs to recover costs plus a ‘fair’ rate of return on its capital assets. This 
process is similar to the regulatory regime adopted by the Queensland Competition Authority 
(QCA). 
 
Great Britain initially adopted14 an alternative approach whereby the main instrument of 
regulation was price capping through limiting permitted price increases to the Retail 
Consumer Price Index minus an efficiency factor ‘x’ (often referred to as RPI-X). The ‘x’ 
factor is a measure of the expected efficiency gains of the regulated utility.  During the 
regulatory period the company can retain any efficiency gains it makes that exceed the ‘x’ 
factor, which provides an incentive to minimise costs and increase productivity (Vass, 1992; 
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Chisholm, 1994). The NZ regulator, the Commerce Commission (NZCC), has adopted a 
similar price capping mechanism.  
 
McInnes (1990) noted that price regulation provides incentives for managers to adopt 
income-reducing accounting policies in order to argue a case for increased prices.  It can also 
encourage companies to reduce costs by lowering product or service quality or create an 
incentive to increase total allowable profits by increasing the value of total assets upon which 
the allowable return is computed.  In the current study we focus on the effect of increased 
asset values.  
 
The NZ and Queensland electricity reforms, in common with international reform themes, 
were based on two key issues: pricing that reflects the true cost of electricity, and competition 
and choice for consumers. The separation of line (distribution) and energy charges (retail) 
was intended to minimise cross-subsidisation and make both sectors more transparent to the 
consumer. Provision for retailers to operate outside previously geographically defined areas 
and the removal of entry barriers for new retailers, promoted consumer choice and 
competition. However, the way in which the sectors susceptible to monopolisation were 
regulated, differed. 
 
New Zealand sought to obtain the benefits of competition and innovation without the heavy 
regulatory regimes evidenced in other countries and initially adopted light-handed regulation 
of its electricity distribution sector through yardstick monitoring15. This approach appeared to 
be unique in the worldwide trend to electricity industry deregulation. The interdependent 
aspects of light-handed regulation were comprehensive information disclosure, general 
competition law to deal with abuse of monopoly power, the threat of heavy-handed 
regulation, and ownership separation of distribution and retailing of electricity. The threat of 
regulation was based on the power of the NZCC to set service quality standards and to 
impose revenue caps such as CPI-X or RPI-X.  By 2008, however, NZ had moved to a more 
heavy-handed regulation of the distribution sector, including the right of the NZCC to impose 
price control on any company which exceeded defined thresholds.   
 
The majority of NZ distribution companies (26 of 28) have some community-trust and/or 
local-authority ownership.  In the case of most trust-owned companies, dividends are in the 
form of rebates (or similar) distributed directly to customers. This, in theory, provides some 
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correlation between excess prices resulting from monopoly pricing and compensatory rebates 
to mitigate their effect (Evans & Meade, 2005).  Thus, 12 of the NZ electricity distribution 
companies meet the ‘consumer-owned’ criteria of Section 54 D of the Commerce Act and are 
exempt from the ‘default and customised price-quality’ regulation that was imposed on 1 
April 2010. The remaining companies are subject to a weighted average price cap in the form 
of CPI-X. These entities are allowed to increase prices by the rate of inflation, after allowing 
for pass through costs (e.g. transmission costs) whilst maintaining quality of supply to 
consumers. 
 
In Queensland, the focus is primarily on regulating the retail price to customers, by 
undertaking annual resets to the Benchmark Retail Cost Index (BRCI) where the QCA 
determines what costs are allowed to be passed through to retail customers on standard retail 
(standing) contracts16. The cost oversight encompasses transmission and distribution costs, 
energy costs, and retail costs. While Queensland customers have the ability to ‘shop around’ 
amongst alternative energy retailers, 57% of households remain on standing contracts.17 The 
standing contract price is therefore the ‘benchmark’ for residential electricity costs.  
 
In the case of distribution costs, Queensland distribution companies are regulated by a 
revenue cap which caps total earnings. This permits Queensland distribution firms to set 
individual tariffs, however total revenue must not exceed the cap. The Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) forecasts the revenue requirement of a business over the regulatory period 
(usually five years) using a building block model that includes operating expenditure 
allowances (based on a benchmark distribution business operating efficiently), and a 
commercial return on capital (AER, 2009). Allowable price increases also reflect the need for 
increasing investment in network infrastructure.  
  
In summary, in NZ the focus is on controlling prices charged in the monopoly sectors 
(transmission and distribution). There is no regulation of the generation or retailing sectors; 
instead the government relies on competitive pressure to ensure that prices reflect true costs.  
In contrast, the Queensland regulatory focus is on the retail price to customers, thus setting a 
benchmark which undermines any notion of a contestable market based on prices alone.  
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FINDINGS 
Relative Size and Growth 
Table 2 compares the scale of electricity industry operations in NZ and Queensland and 
measures growth in recent years - we use 2000 and 2011.  This covers the period of industry 
reform in both jurisdictions, although full retail contestability did not commence in 
Queensland until 2007.  
 
Table 2: Relative size of the New Zealand and Queensland electricity industries 
NEW ZEALAND QUEENSLAND 
2000 2011 Growth % 2000 2011 Growth % 
Population 3,860,100  4,407,400 547,300 14% 3,530,816 4,513,850  983,034 28% 
Generation (capacity MW) 8,259  9,667 1,408 17% 7,800 12,692  4,892 63% 
Energy volumes (GWh into 
grid) 38,069  43,138 5,070 13% 38,447 48,020  9,573 25% 
Energy volumes (GWh 
delivered to customers) 34,010  37,676 3,665 11% 36,953 46,216  9,263 25% 
Transmission (max 
demand MW) 5,574  6,654 1,080 19% 6,323 8,836  2,513 40% 
Geographic area (square 
km) 268,021    1,730,648    
Distribution (length km) 136,497  150,390 13,893 10% 179,000 199,256  20,256 11% 
Retail (connections) 1,728,364  1,973,826 245,462 14% 1,670,000 1,978,885  308,885 18% 
 
In two key areas - population and number of network connections - the figures are very 
similar.  Queensland's population at 2011 is just 100,000 greater than that of NZ, and there 
are only 5,000 more individual electricity connections.  However, Queensland's population 
over the period has grown (28%) at twice the rate of NZ’s (14%).  While Queensland’s 
geographic area is more than six times that of NZ, the length of electricity distribution lines is 
just 32% greater, reflecting the concentration of population into Queensland’s South-East and 
Pacific coastal strip, and the fact that large parts of Outback Queensland are not reticulated.  
In both cases the reach of reticulated electricity (as measured by line length) has grown by the 
same proportion.  
 
Growth in generation capacity and maximum demand in NZ (17% and 19% respectively) is 
slightly more than the population increase.  However, Queensland's generation capacity has 
grown by an extraordinary 63% over the 11 years, and maximum demand has gone up by 
40% over the period.  A number of factors have contributed to this: the boom in Australia's 
mineral extraction and export sector has required investment in new generation; peak summer 
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load for air-conditioning has grown rapidly18; and a significant amount of energy is exported 
to southern states via interstate transmission lines which have been built in the last few years 
(generation is cheaper in Queensland because of the availability of coal and gas). 
   
Energy volumes (GWh delivered to customers) have grown by 11% in NZ, but by 25% in 
Queensland - in each case 3% less than the population growth. Notably, the growth in 
generation capacity in Queensland has been much greater than the growth in delivered energy 
volumes. From this it could be expected that Queensland’s price increases will be driven 
largely by the costs of new generation, paralleling the NZ experience where increases in 
generation and retailing costs have outstripped increases in transmission and distribution 
costs. However, our findings show this is not the case.  We examine reasons for this contrast, 
particularly in respect of accounting policies and regulatory issues.   
 
Transmission and Distribution Assets: Queensland and New Zealand 
Three Government-owned corporations are responsible for electricity transmission and 
distribution in Queensland – Powerlink (transmission), Energex and Ergon (distribution).  We 
examine the financial accounts19 of these firms to determine whether any specific accounting 
policies or practices have contributed to the increase in costs of electricity delivery. As a 
comparison we examine the accounts of the equivalent NZ entities: TransPower 
(transmission); and the regulatory accounts filed by the 28 NZ electricity distribution 
companies. 
 
In each jurisdiction some networks assets have been revalued to reflect Optimised 
Depreciated Replacement Cost (ODRC), mainly to ensure that there is an equitable base for 
comparing return on assets between electricity transmission and distribution companies.  
However, these upwards adjustments in asset values have led to an expectation that a fair rate 
of return will be earned on the new asset values. Increased asset values, without 
corresponding increases in sales volumes, lower the return on assets and provide a basis for 
motivating an increase in electricity prices (McInnes, 1990). Asset values are, therefore, 
important in determining allowable electricity prices in a regulated environment. There are 
two main contributors to the increase in asset values – the large capital works programmes of 
the transmission and distribution companies; and the effect of asset revaluations. This section 
analyses to what extent new capital investment, and revaluations of existing assets, have 
stimulated price increases. 
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Table 3 shows a snapshot of book values for 2003/04 and for 2010/11, with aggregate 
movements between these two financial years.  As a benchmark, the table also includes 
growth in maximum demand, and in energy volumes delivered to customers. 
 
Table 3: Transmission and distribution – capital expenditure and asset revaluations 
NEW ZEALAND QUEENSLAND 
2003/04 2010/11 Growth % 2003/04 2010/11 Growth % 
Total Assets ($m) $8,043.0 $12,949.5 $4,906.5 61% $11,705.6 $26,375.2  $14,669.7 126% 
Energy volumes (GWh 
delivered to customers) 37,164  37,676 512 1% 43,270 46,216  2,946 7% 
Transmission (max 
demand MW) 6,074  6,654 581 10% 7,934 8,836  902 11% 
Cumulative figures for 8 years 2003/04 to 2010/11 
Capital expenditure ($m)   $6,122.5    $14,727.8    
  as % of 2003/04 asset 
values    76%   126%     
Asset revaluations – net of 
deferred tax effect ($m) $1,525.2 $3,819.7 
  as % of 2003/04 asset 
values 19% 33% 
 
 
Capital works programmes 
Between 2003/04 and 2010/11 the combined total book value of the Queensland assets for 
Powerlink, Energex, and Ergon (consisting principally of the network of lines and cables 
used in the transmission and distribution of electricity from generation assets to end 
consumers) increased by 126%20.  During this period maximum electricity demand increased 
by only 11%, and the volume of electricity delivered increased by only 7%.  While 
investment in lines and cables has to be adequate to cope with foreseeable maximum demand, 
the additional expenditure in Queensland can be only partially explained by the slightly 
higher demand growth, although there appears to be some significant investment to provide 
for future growth and to make the supply to current customers more reliable. However, the 
costs of this investment are largely recovered on the basis of volume charges (i.e. cents per 
kWh).  Despite the increase in network assets during the period, the return on total assets 
remained between 6% and 8%, a result which can only be achieved by significant increases in 
the sale price per kWh.  
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In NZ, the value of transmission and distribution assets increased by a more modest 61% 
between 2003/04 and 2010/11.  Maximum demand increased by 10% but energy delivered 
increased by only 1%. Capital expenditure on transmission and distribution assets for the 
period was approximately $6.1 billion – 76% of the 2003/04 book value.  However, it is 
generally acknowledged that there has been under-investment in the transmission 
infrastructure, which is currently being remedied, with TransPower’s capital investment 
programme forecast to rise to $900m per annum in the next two years, compared to less than 
$100m per annum up to 2004/05. 
 
Asset Revaluation 
The second driver of increases in asset values is revaluation.  In Queensland, the increase in 
asset values was partly attributable to a decision by the QCA to review (and subsequently 
increase) the standard lives of regulated assets, thus increasing their carrying value.  Plant and 
equipment (network infrastructure) were revalued upwards by $3.8 billion during the period 
2003/04 to 2010/11.  Using the WACC allowed by AER in their May 2010 determination, 
this would increase annual allowable network costs by $400 million per annum, or just over 
$200 per annum per average electricity retail connection21.   
 
In the NZ context the assets of TransPower are reported in their annual accounts at cost, less 
accumulated depreciation, and not at revaluation as is the case with transmission assets in 
Queensland.  Distribution assets are recorded in NZ electricity company regulatory accounts 
at Optimised Deprival Value (ODV).  ODV adjustments have been based on the Consumer 
Price Index.  Movements in the CPI have generally been between 2% and 3% per annum. The 
result is that asset revaluations in NZ in the 7 years to 2010/11 have totalled $1.5 billion 
(19% of the 2004 base figure), compared to $3.8 billion in Queensland (33% of the 2004 base 
figure). 
 
The significance of the large asset revaluations in Queensland is that the Queensland 
Government-owned transmission and distribution corporations expect to earn a regulated 
return (currently 9.72%) on the revalued assets.  Actual returns on assets (EBIT/average 
assets) have ranged from 5% to 7% for each company over the last 10 years. The current 
weighted average return (2010/11 financial year) across the three entities is 7.3%.  
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The return on assets for NZ's transmission and distribution companies, calculated on the same 
basis, is 8% for the 2010/11 financial year. On face value it appears that the NZ network 
owners are extracting larger profits. However, this profit is calculated on a lower and more 
stable asset valuation. In contrast, Queensland network prices have had to increase at a faster 
rate over the last decade to maintain a stable rate of return on the rapidly increasing asset 
base: an example of accounting policies influencing pricing decisions and affecting the 
average consumer/elector’s perception of whether he/she is getting value for money when 
using an essential commodity. 
 
Electricity Prices 
In this section we compare price movements for residential customers in both Queensland 
and NZ, in order to determine whether there is any correlation between price movements, 
industry restructuring, ownership and changes to accounting policy. Figure 1 shows a 
comparison of price movements over 21 years since 1990.  
 
 Figure 1: Retail prices: residential households22 
   
The graph shows that NZ residential electricity prices have increased in real terms by 79% 
over the period, while Queensland residential electricity prices have increased in real terms 
by only 33% over the same time.  It is notable that Queensland prices (inflation adjusted) 
remained at or below the 1990 price, right through to 2006/07.  New Zealand prices show a 
steadier upward trend right through the period. However, in both cases the most significant 
price increases have followed immediately after the separation of electricity retailing from 
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electricity distribution. This occurred in NZ in 1999/2000, when electricity distribution 
companies were required to divest themselves of generation and retailing activities. In 
Queensland, the catalyst for this separation was the introduction of full retail contestability 
and the sale of Energex’s retail business in 2006/0723.  Figure 2 shows a more detailed 
analysis of price movements over the period since industry restructuring, by separating the 
two major components – network (lines) charges and energy (generation and retail) charges. 
The purpose is to examine whether the same cost drivers applied in both jurisdictions in this 
period. 
 
Figure 2: Price trends since industry restructuring 
  
This graph shows the two main components of retail electricity prices for residential 
households - energy costs (generation plus retail margin) and network costs.  The base year is 
the year immediately before the separation took place.  The graph shows 12 years of data for 
NZ, while there is only 4 years of data available for Queensland (since full retail 
contestability did not take place until 2006/07). 
 
Even with the limited data available, there are some striking differences between Queensland 
and NZ. The increases in NZ electricity transmission and distribution costs have consistently 
been below inflation, as measured by the CPI (i.e. this component of residential household 
power bills is now less, in real terms, than it was in 1998/99).  However, the generation and 
retailing component of residential bills is now over 90% higher, in real terms, than it was in 
1998/99.  This represents an annual compounding rate of increase of 5.5% over and above 
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the CPI rate of inflation. In the case of Queensland, electricity transmission and distribution 
costs have risen by 44% in real terms (i.e. inflation adjusted) in the four years since the 
separation of electricity retailing from electricity distribution.  This represents an annual 
compounding rate of increase of 9.5% over and above the CPI rate of inflation.  While the 
energy component of household power accounts has also increased, the rise has been a more 
modest 13% in inflation-adjusted dollars. 
 
It is notable that the electricity sectors which have experienced the most significant price 
increases since the separation of retailing from distribution are those where Government 
ownership is dominant - Queensland electricity transmission and distribution, and NZ 
electricity generation and retailing. We examine these sectors in more detail.  
 
Transmission and distribution 
Price control regulation in Queensland is based on allowable cost recovery. The reason given 
for the significant cost increases in transmission and distribution is that successive 
governments have under-invested in the electricity network, and therefore a ‘catch-up’ is 
essential. While commentators acknowledge this fact24, there are also other factors which 
contribute, such as accounting revaluations (particularly the Ergon revaluations) while 
maintaining the same rate of return on the revalued assets. The rate of return allowed by the 
AER on these assets (9.72%) appears to be very high, given the nature of the investment and 
the credit-worthiness of the owner – especially when Government bonds are earning less than 
half this rate.  Increases allowed by the regulator have recently been reduced or overturned by 
the Queensland government, because of the political risk they posed for the incumbent25. The 
recovery of network costs in Queensland remains a political football, with drivers alternating 
between the expedient of recovering excessive returns on revalued assets (thus adding to 
Government revenues), and the necessity of ensuring that price increases are modest so that 
the chances of re-election are enhanced. 
 
In NZ, transmission assets are owned and operated by TransPower (a State-Owned 
Corporation).  However, there is no Government involvement in electricity distribution. 
 
The key differences in transmission and distribution between Queensland and NZ are 
summarised as: 
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Transmission 
 Different accounting treatments: While Powerlink (Queensland) has revalued its 
network assets upwards by $1 billion since 2000, TransPower’s (NZ) assets remain at 
depreciated cost.  Powerlink’s asset revaluations have placed additional pressure on 
transmission prices, to maintain the same rate of return on the larger asset base. 
 Dividend policy: The NZ government has not extracted any dividends from 
TransPower for at least five years, thus allowing TransPower to utilize a greater 
proportion of internal funding for its capital works programme.  Powerlink has paid 
$497 million in dividends to the Queensland government in the same period. 
 Capital works programme: The programmes of Powerlink and TransPower are very 
similar over the last three years (approximately $1.6 billion in each case). However, 
TransPower’s capital works programme is currently increasing ($733m in 2010/11), 
while Powerlink’s has reduced somewhat (only $475m in 2010/11). 
 
It therefore appears that the political environment, and accounting policies regarding asset 
revaluation and earnings rates, are significant drivers in the rapid increase in Queensland 
network costs, having at least as much effect as the growth in electricity demand. 
 
Distribution 
As previously stated, local community ownership dominates this sector in NZ, while the two 
distributors in Queensland are both owned by the government.  The different ownership 
structures, and differences in regulatory regimes, have resulted in different cost drivers: 
 The AER has been much more generous in the costs allowed to be passed through to 
Queensland households26.  For the five years to June 2015, additional costs allowed 
represented an increase of 9.2% in year one, and 2.6% in subsequent years. In 
comparison, the NZCC set a reduced allowable return on capital which would have 
required Vector – the largest NZ distributor – to reduce prices by 9%27. Similarly, 
TransPower announced that NZCC determinations on its Maximum Allowable 
Revenues (MAR) would have the effect of reducing 2011/12 revenues by $25m and 
NPAT by $18m.28  
 The AER has allowed for WACC to be set at 9.72% for the period 1 July 2010 to 30 
June 2015 – 126 basis points higher than the previous regulatory period.29  In contrast 
the NZ equivalent set by the NZCC is 7.06% 30  for TransPower, and 8.05% for 
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electricity distributors31. The higher WACC in Queensland has a material effect on 
electricity price increases. 
 The majority of community trusts, which own shares in NZ electricity distribution 
companies, distribute their dividend income back to the community, usually as a 
rebate on the customer’s electricity bill.  For example, the majority owner of the 
largest distributor, Vector, is a Consumers’ Trust which distributes rebates of over 
$300 annually to each power consumer served by its network. This dividend is 
allocated from tax-paid profits, and is returned to the same people who paid Vector’s 
network charges. This dividend represents a return of 16% of the annual electricity 
costs for a customer using 8000 kWh per annum.  This environment incentivises 
community trusts to minimise price increases, as the only beneficiary of excess profits 
is the NZ tax authority. Where there is Government ownership, as in Queensland, the 
incentive is to maximize returns from commercial enterprises to fund government 
expenditure.   
 
In summary, there are multiple drivers including ownership structures, regulatory regimes, 
and agency policy, which account for network price increases in NZ being much lower than 
in Queensland. 
 
Generation and Retailing 
Many of the drivers explained in the previous section, apply in reverse to the generation and 
retailing sectors.   
 
Costs incurred by Queensland’s generation and retailing sectors are scrutinised by the 
regulator as part of the process of setting the BRCI.  Each component of these cost changes is 
a matter of public record, and some material items are analysed below.  By contrast, the NZ 
regulator does not have any oversight of the generation and retailing sectors, but instead 
relies on competitive market forces to ensure that price increases are minimised.  However, it 
is debatable whether there is a truly competitive market, when: 
 67% of electricity generation in NZ is controlled by the NZ Government, through its 
three SOEs - Meridian Energy, Mighty River Power, and Genesis Energy. A further 
23% is owned by Contact Energy, which was also a SOE prior to the sale of the NZ 
Government’s shareholding. The proportion of generation controlled by these four 
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companies has increased by 10% since industry restructuring, because of the 
regulatory requirement that distribution companies divest themselves of electricity 
generation facilities.   
 Together these four companies control almost all of NZ’s hydro generation and 
geothermal generation resources. This gives them a significant economic advantage 
over any new market entrants, who are dependent on fossil fuels or wind generation.  
Hydro generation accounts for 58% of generation in NZ, and geothermal accounts for 
a further 13%. The allocation of hydro and geothermal resources to the three 
Government-owned and one privatised generators therefore acts as a barrier for 
prospective new entrants to the market.  The degree of market power exercised by 
these four companies was recognised in research (the Wolak report, 2009) 
commissioned by the NZCC which suggested that over a period of six and a half 
years they ‘exercised their substantial market power to earn market rents estimated 
conservatively to be $4.3 billion’. 
 61% of electricity retailing is controlled by the SOEs, and a further 24% by Contact 
Energy. 
 The four companies are vertically integrated ‘gentailers’ where their generation 
capacity is largely matched with the energy demands of their customers, particularly 
on a geographic basis. 
 While competition for new customers appears to be strong (percentage of customers 
switching retailers has varied from 8.3% to 16.3% per year, and is growing strongly); 
the relative market share of each retailer is relatively constant (average annual gain or 
loss of market share is in the range of -0.7% to +0.6%).  Most customer switching is 
initiated when the current electricity supplier increases their prices, causing customers 
to look for cheaper alternatives.  In due course the process is repeated, as the cheaper 
retailer ‘leap frogs’ the prices of its competitors.  This leads to minimal net changes in 
market share. 
 In 2013 the NZ Government sold 49% of the shares in Mighty River Power and 
Meridian Energy, and is currently (April 2014) selling down its stake in Genesis 
Energy. The sale price of these shares has been determined by the earnings history 
and growth potential of each company, so it is natural that the current owner should 
seek to maximize profits prior to sale.  To illustrate, the dividends declared by Mighty 
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River Power have increased by an average of 25% per annum over the 5 years prior to 
the share sale.32  
 
Taking all these factors into account, it is not surprising that price increases in NZ have 
largely been driven by increases in energy (generation plus retail) costs; rather than increases 
in network costs. The common thread between Queensland and NZ is that the sector where 
Government ownership is most dominant is the sector that is driving increases in retail 
household electricity bills. 
 
While generation/retail sector price increases in Queensland since the industry separation 
have been relatively modest, there have been a number of instances when retailers have 
successfully appealed against draft decisions of the regulating body. These have added 
significant sums to household electricity costs. For example, the draft decision of the QCA 
provided for a 5.38% increase in the BRCI for 2008/09, however, the final decision was 
revised to an increase of 9.06%, after recalculating load profiles for residential customers, 
and taking into account costs of $51 million in customer acquisition.   
 
CONCLUSION  
This study has traced the link between changes in the structural and regulatory regimes of the 
NZ and Queensland electricity industries and unit pricing. The broad theme underpinning the 
restructuring of the electricity industries in both jurisdictions has been a concern about 
inefficiency in the industry as a whole. This had resulted in allegations of excessive profits, 
and higher prices to electricity consumers than might be expected in a more efficient and 
competitive market. 
 
The objectives of promoting efficiency and competition have been at the heart of the 
regulatory provisions, and yet it appears that the regulatory environment is not delivering 
optimal outcomes for consumers. Although unit prices, post-reform, have increased in both 
jurisdictions, the rate of increase has differed and is found to be largely attributable to the 
costing structures associated with sectors that remain under government control. It is 
concluded that, contrary to the rationale for the imposition of regulatory controls in a non-
market environment, the regulatory regimes appear to have contributed to higher pricing 
structures rather than an intention to minimise any increase in unit pricing. This observation 
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has potentially important implications for Governments and regulators - does the regulatory 
framework and the practices of the regulatory agencies provide sufficient incentives for 
government controlled entities (e.g. electricity retailers in NZ and electricity distributors in 
Queensland) to encourage operational efficiencies? Alternatively, and given the more modest 
price increases attributable to the private and community-owned sectors of the electricity 
industry (electricity distributors in NZ and electricity retailers in Queensland), should further 
privatisation occur for the residual government controlled services? The nature of the 
respective electricity industries indicates that there will always be an important role for 
regulation. The research questions the effectiveness of regulation where the State owns the 
service provider and also appoints and sets the terms of reference for the regulator.  It is 
acknowledged that drivers other than Government ownership - such as the rate of 
infrastructure investment and the financial framework affecting funding - may affect the 
timing of price rises in different sectors of the electricity industry. However, the strong 
correlation (since industry restructuring) between price increases and Government ownership 
in both NZ and Queensland is confirmed by our analysis. This provides material for further 
research in other areas of the economy where Government ownership and state regulation 
conflict.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                            
1 The electricity industries within all of Australia have undergone profound reform since the 1990s, however, for reasons 
explained in the paper, the focus is on the Australian State of Queensland's electricity industry. 
2 Proponents of electricity industry reform argue that the quest for improved efficiency derives a broader array of benefits, 
for example, technological innovation, lower cost to consumers, and improved investment decision making. 
3  The transportation of electricity from generators to consumers requires both transmission and distribution networks. 
Transmission networks transport electricity at high voltages across the country (NZ) or State (Queensland) while distribution 
networks distribute electricity at lower voltages from transmission connection points to households, small businesses and 
industrial users. Retailing is the sale of electricity to consumers. 
4 Although the largest company (Vector) is listed on the NZ Stock Exchange, 75% of the shares are owned by a community 
trust whose beneficiaries are local power consumers.  Two companies are owned by overseas entities. 
5 66% of electricity customers are in South East Queensland, although this is only 3% of the State’s land area. 
6 The Australian National Electricity Market was based on a belief that the industry would derive considerable efficiency 
gains through free and fair competition which in turn would facilitate lower prices. 
7 Approximately 68% of the Queensland retail sector is controlled by listed companies who purchased the retail customers of 
Energex. 
8 Since 2007 Ergon Energy has supplied electricity into the main grid of Queensland, and owns and operates a number of 
stand-alone generators that service regional communities that are unable to access the main grid. 
9 Customers of Ergon prior to 2007 may remain with Ergon, and will be charged at government-set tariffs.  However, if they 
accept an offer from another retailer they may not return to Ergon, nor can any future owner or occupier at those premises.  
This makes Ergon ‘non-competing’. 
10 http://www.energy.qld.gov.au/energy/tips-elect-retailer.htm 
11 Generation: percentages based on generation capacity. 
    Transmission and distribution: percentages based on asset values. 
    Retail: percentages based on retail market share. 
12 Generation (power stations), transmission (high voltage power lines), distribution (low voltage power lines transferring 
electricity from grid supply points to consumers) and retail (supplying end users).    
13 ‘Grid exit point’ (GXP) is the connection between the high-voltage transmission network, and the lower voltage local 
distribution network.  
14 The UK has now moved to a building block approach (see Mountain and Littlechild, 2010). 
15  Note that the Electricity Reform Act 1998 required previously integrated distribution and retail companies to sell one of 
those business activities. This ultimate in heavy handed regulation far exceeded the legal and accounting separation in other 
countries e.g. UK, Victoria.   
16 http://www.energy.qld.gov.au/documents/energy/43-_Extra-Gazette-Electricity-Prices-2012-13.pdf 
17 'State of the Energy Market 2011' published by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) section 4.4.2, page 113. 
18 The number of Brisbane houses with aircon has risen from 23% to 72% in the last 12 years.  Presentation to Multi-Party 
Climate Change Committee by Rod Sims Adviser to the Committee 10 November 2010. 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/committee/rod-sims-energy-market-
outlook.ashx 
19 These figures are taken from the annual reports. 
20 The assets of Powerlink – operator of Queensland’s transmission network – make up $6.6 billion of the 2010/11 total.  
“This represents a fivefold increase in fixed assets since the corporation was formed in January 1995.”  (Quote from 
Powerlink 2010/11 Annual Report, page 6). 
21 For simplicity the effects of increased depreciation have been omitted.  The average of $200 per annum is calculated over 
all electricity connections – larger electricity consumers (industrial and commercial) will pay proportionately more, while 
residential households will pay less. 
22 Queensland data sourced from State of the Energy Market 2011 (ACCC) table 4.5, page 116; NZ data sourced from NZ 
Energy Data file 2011 (MED) table 1, pages 130, 131. 
23 The graph also shows that prices were held or reduced (in real terms) in the years immediately prior to restructuring, 
possibly because the incumbent managers wished to show the efficiency of the regime which they were responsible for, to 
avoid the threat of restructuring. 
24 Steven Wardill, Courier Mail, 28 April 2012. 
25  Energex and Ergon were prevented from recovering increased revenue allowances determined by the Australian 
Competition Tribunal in 2011/12, thus reducing price increases from 8.3% to 6.6%.  The new Queensland Premier, 
Campbell Newman, also announced a price freeze on retail electricity prices for 2012/13. 
26 State of the Energy Market 2011, table 1 page 5. 
27 William Curtayne, Milford Asset Management - Company News, 22 July 2011. 
28 TransPower media release 13 September 2010. 
29 AER's final decision on Queensland distribution determinations for Energex and Ergon Energy. 
30 TransPower media release 13 September 2010. 
31 Determination of the Cost of Capital for Services Regulated under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986, Decision no 718 3 
March 2011 – Midpoint vanilla WACC for default Price-Quality paths. 
32 http://www.mightyriver.co.nz/Investor-Centre/About-Mighty-River-Power.aspx (website accessed 24 March 2014) 
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